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NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL
SYSTEMS IN GLOBAL COMPE-





In the German Federal Republic a system of
labour market institutions has been created that
has strongly regulated the labour market. Powerful
collective bargaining parties determine wage
developments via area-wide collective wage agree-
ments. By means of generally binding declarations,
the contents of collective wage agreements are
extended to non-union members. 70–80 percent of
wages and salaries are thus subject to collective
wage agreements. Protection against dismissal is
comparably strong. Until recently temporary jobs
and temporary agency work were thoroughly regu-
lated. The systems of social protection ensure that
wide segments of the population are protected
against diverse risks at a high level. They form an
important component of redistribution policies.
The system of labour market institutions has con-
tributed to correcting failures of the labour market
and producing more social justice than the market
provides. On the other hand, it has led to losses in
economic efficiency and increased unemployment
in Germany. It is made responsible for problems
Germany has as an investment location.The nega-
tive effects have become especially perceptible in
recent years.This has led to demands for thorough
reform of labour market institutions. Such reforms
have been largely delayed, even though Germany
is exposed to intensive global competition that also
affects institutional regulations.
Why has global competition (also referred to as
systems competition) not led to fundamental
labour market reforms? Have the forces of systems
competition been too weak? Or has the reform
willingness been weakened by effective counter
forces?
Reasons for the introduction of labour market
institutions
Labour market institutions are created for differ-
ent reasons. On the one hand they are meant to
reduce inefficiencies as a result of market failure.
Market failure can result from monopoly power,
external effects as well as asymmetric information.
If monopoly power is on the side of the employees,
efficiency gains can be achieved, depending on cir-
cumstances, by means of opt-out clauses in the col-
lective wage agreements or a modification of the
so-called principle of advantage. In the case of
external effects false incentives can be avoided by
an internalisation of regulations. When, for exam-
ple, enterprises neglect education and further
training because skilled workers can be hired from
other enterprises, this can be countered by levying
a training tax on companies that do not train for
the benefit of those that do. If a company does not
offer maternity leave because of the danger of
adverse selection, the legislator can encounter this
by making it obligatory for all enterprises to offer
maternity leave (Blau and Kahn 1999, p. 1405).
In addition to regulations that pursue an increase
in efficiency, institutions are also created to cor-
rect the distribution results of the market and to
increase earnings stability. The introduction of
central wage bargaining systems is frequently car-
ried out with the aim of reducing the wage gap.
Social security systems also aim at guaranteeing
secure earnings when serious social difficulties
occur.
Finally,institutional arrangements can be the result
of the influence of pressure groups.The protection
against dismissal can be seen as an example of
interest-oriented regulations that those who have
jobs (insiders) achieve at the expense of the unem-
ployed (outsiders). The protection against dis-
missal increases job security for the insiders and
enables them to negotiate higher wages without
jeopardising their jobs.
For improved efficiency, income redistribution and
under the influence of powerful pressure groups, a
highly developed system of labour market regula-
tions has been created in Germany.Its most impor-
tant components are freedom of collective bar-
gaining with industry-wide wage agreements, pro-
tection against dismissal and a generous system of
social protection. * Wolfgang Ochel is researcher at the Ifo Institute, Munich.The German labour market institutions:
Maintaining an internationally high level
The German collective bargaining system has been
very stable. Since the 1960s, the collective bargaining
coverage has for a long time been about 90 percent.
This exceeds that of most OECD countries, and in
some countries (Great Britain, USA and New
Zealand) this coverage has declined considerably.
Wage negotiations are strongly co-ordinated in
Germany (Ochel 2003). In this point as well, no
change can be seen since the 1960s, in contrast to
other countries (Nickell et al. 2001, pp. 28–30). West
German labour costs per hour in manufacturing have
held top rankings in an international comparison
since the early 1980s. Important rivals such as France
or Great Britain have labour costs that are under
Germany’s by more than a quarter (Schröder 2002).
The protection against dismissal in Germany is
strong in an international comparison. The OECD
carried out the most comprehensive evaluation of
the strictness of employment protection for their
member states, according to which Germany
ranked 14 among 19 countries at the end of the
1980s (rankings increase with the strictness of pro-
tection). Employees in the Anglo-Saxon countries
enjoyed the lowest protection against dismissal;
the highest protection was in Southern European
countries. During the 1990s it became somewhat
easier to dismiss workers in Germany, but still
Germany was ranked 13 among 19 countries for
this decade (OECD 1999, p. 66).
The social security systems have been expanded in
Germany on a relatively large scale. They burden
employee earnings with high social insurance con-
tributions. In the case of a single employee, social
insurance contributions as a percentage of average
gross wages increased to 30.8 percent in 2002 from
24.8 percent in 1979 (OECD 2003, pp. 396ff.). The
marginal tax rate on additional income of the aver-
age German employee was 66 percent in 2001.This
placed Germany in the top group of OECD coun-
tries. Even welfare states such as Sweden or the
Netherlands impose a lower burden on the average
employee (Sinn 2003a, p. 18).1
Unemployment assistance and social welfare are
granted without time limits in Germany.They pro-
vide the recipient with an above-average net
income in an international comparison. The net
replacement rates of a married couple with two
children with reference to average earnings was 65
percent in Germany in 1999 (OECD 2002, pp. 15,
23–24 & 36).The tax financed unemployment assis-
tance and social welfare are important instruments
of redistribution in Germany.
Labour market institutions in systems competition
In an open economy,labour market institutions are
exposed to systems competition. Governments
must bear in mind that many actors have the
choice of cross-border movement. Internationally
mobile enterprises and production factors can,
with their locational decisions, show how they rate
the institutional attractiveness of national sites. To
some extent only the announcement of locational
changes or the mere reference to more beneficial
foreign institutions suffices to influence their own
governments.
The functioning of systems competition differs
according to whether the labour market institu-
tions influence the position of enterprises in inter-
national competition or whether they contain a
redistribution between rich and poor within a
country. If the locational conditions of a country
deteriorate relative to other countries, site-inde-
pendent enterprises may change sites. Such loca-
tional shifts can be triggered by high wages result-
ing from a high unionisation of employees, the
dominance of area-wide collective wage agree-
ments and the extension of wage agreements to
non-unionised workers.They can also be the result
of strong protection against dismissal that limits
the reversibility of hiring decisions and thus
reduces, according to new investment theory, the
attractiveness of a location for risky investment
projects (Pull 2001).If such reactions of the mobile
factors occur to a large extent, this can encourage
governments to take this into account and to
change their institutional regulations.
With regard to redistribution, systems competition
works in another way.Take the example of a coun-
try with a generous social insurance system. In an
open economy, with the right to change the coun-
try of residence, people with good risks tend to
leave this state, whereas people with bad risks are
attracted to it.To reduce factor migration, net con-
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tributors are placed in a better position and net
recipients in a worse position by means of benefit
cuts. As other countries react the same way, the
social insurance systems are eroded. A desirable
re-distribution policy from the national point of
view, which is the reason for establishing a social
insurance system, suffers from this competition
(Sinn 2003b).
Such a race to the bottom can occur both with
regard to national redistribution systems and also
with the labour market institutions related to loca-
tion competition. An erosion of labour market
institutions has not yet occurred in Germany. The
question is:“Why not?”.
Low intensity of systems competition
The limited effect of systems competition on
German labour market institutions might be a
result of its low intensity, for which there are dif-
ferent causes.
The agents of production have differing roles in
systems competition.They are not all mobile to the
same extent. Cross-border portfolio investments
and loans are subject to few constraints today.
Direct investment to and from Germany has
increased strongly, particularly since the mid-
1980s. On the other hand, labour mobility – with
the exception of the small group of management
elite – is quite restricted. Despite a virtually unlim-
ited freedom of movement in the European Union,
no appreciable migration of workers has occurred.
Movement is restricted by transaction and mobili-
ty costs. Also the immigration of non-EU aliens is
relatively small. It is administratively restricted.
The factor labour has thus made only a small con-
tribution to systems competition.
But also capital has only made a limited contribu-
tion to institutional competition despite its high
mobility.This is because site decisions are not only
based on labour market institutions but depend on
many other determinants. For example, proximity
to the consumer is the determining investment
motive for sales-oriented direct investment.
Procurement-oriented direct investment, on the
other hand, is motivated by the presence of com-
plementary factors of production, the existence of
supplier industries, the strength of the domestic
competition, the government’s economic policy,
etc. (Porter 1990). The migration of capital, as a
rule, does not take place selectively with regard to
individual institutional regulations (for example, a
relatively strong protection against dismissal), but
with regard to a whole complex of institutional
regulations, tax laws as well as other determinants.
Labour market institutions play only a subordinate
role in a company’s site decisions. In addition,
migration of capital presupposes that the migrating
enterprises have (company-related) competitive
advantages that enable them to displace foreign
enterprises in their own countries.2
Systems competition – political competition
For systems competition to have its effect,the reac-
tions of the mobile factors of production must be
relevant for politicians who shape national institu-
tional systems. Politicians also compete, and their
utmost goal is re-election. This means that they
must take the interests of all voters into considera-
tion and not only those of the mobile factors. The
extent to which the interests of the mobile factors
of production are respected depends on a number
of factors.
The influence of systems competition is higher in a
small country with great external economic ties
than in a large country. The same applies to an
economy in which tradable goods and locationally
unbounded firms have a comparably high share in
economic output.The share of employees and thus
the voters that are exposed to international institu-
tional competition is correspondingly high.
In addition to these objective factors,considering the
reactions of the mobile factors of production
depends on the ability of the government to identify
those institutions in the country that have led to
business relocations.This presupposes that the politi-
cians who are exposed to diverse factors in their
decision-making are aware of the needs of mobile
enterprises and workers. Their interests and the
interests of the indirectly affected immobile factors
of production must be organised in order to under-
score the necessity of reform in the identified insti-
tutional areas. The interests are especially regarded
when the government is threatened by sanctions in
political competition (Streit and Kiwit 1999).
2 If this is not the case, they are exposed to the import competition
from foreign enterprises (unless the domestic institutions that hin-
der competitiveness are reformed in time; Dunning 1981).Such sanctions presuppose that a majority of the
voters approve of the reform of labour market
institutions, i.e., that they favour a decentralisation
of collective bargaining, a weakening of the protec-
tion against dismissal and/or a reform of the social
insurance systems. But it is questionable whether
this approval can be found. Empirical studies have
shown that as an economy becomes more open
(and with it a potentially greater influence of sys-
tems competition on political competition) the
security interests of the population increase
(Rodrik 1997; Agell 1999). The state is expected to
take safeguarding measures to counter the height-
ened insecurity as a result of globalisation.
Such a voter attitude can be influenced, however,
by pointing out the negative economic results of a
refusal to reform. Surprisingly, social-democratic
governments are better at this than conservative
governments,since people tend to believe that they
are lowering social benefits out of objective neces-
sity than for ideological motives (Cukierman and
Tommasi 1998). This might partially explain the
reform backlog that occurred during the Kohl era.
Path dependency and institutional inflexibility
With systems competition that has accompanied
globalisation, the pressure has increased to reform
the systems of institutional rules with a view to the
reactions of the mobile factors of production.But to
what extent are national institutional systems
changeable? According to the thesis of the path
dependency of institutional development,path devi-
ations lead to disruptions of institutional compati-
bility and are accompanied by considerable costs.
The result is a broad-scale institutional inflexibility.
Positive-feedback effects are responsible for the
path inflexibility of institutional development.
Following David (1994),Ackermann (2001) distin-
guishes three causes of positive feedback with
respect to institutions.They refer to levels at which
individuals interact with each other, to the regula-
tion level that structures these interactions and to
how the interaction and regulations levels affect
each other. On the interaction level co-ordination
effects arise from the advantages of the compati-
bility of standardised behaviour.These can lead to
stable regulations.On the regulation level,comple-
mentary effects can arise if the interdependent
relationships between institutions are complemen-
tary, that is, if compliance with a regulation
becomes more attractive through the interdepen-
dence with other regulations.Finally,positive-feed-
back effects from the interaction between the level
of social regulations and that of individual behav-
iour result from the fact that, by means of social
communication in a society, the mental models of
individuals in the society converge.
According to the concept of path dependency, the
feedback effects result in the path of the institu-
tional development strongly limiting the scope for
institutional change. For this reason suboptimal
institutions are also preserved. A deviation from
the path of institutional development does not
occur until the actors assess their efficiency losses
as higher than the costs for creating new, efficient
institutions (North 1992).
A more detailed explanation for the effectiveness of
feedback effects is provided by the “theory of com-
parative institutional advantages”, which looks at
the labour market institutions that are relevant to
competitiveness.According to this theory, a special-
isation of countries with regard to specific products
is linked with a specialisation in particular institu-
tional structures. The United States, for example,
with its deregulated labour markets and dynamic
venture capital markets would provide advantages
to those businesses that emphasise “radical innova-
tions” (development of completely new products,
implementation of new production methods). In
order to implement such innovations, they must be
able to employ and dismiss workers quickly, to start
up companies easily, etc. Under such general condi-
tions, firms thrive particularly well in the fields of
biotechnology, software development, microelec-
tronics,entertainment,etc.In Germany,on the other
hand, the theory points out that a system of indus-
trial law has developed providing job security, in-
company training,worker participation possibilities,
etc. In addition, the German system of corporate
governance offers businesses a long-term planning
horizon. This and other elements favour incremen-
tal innovations (continuous, small improvements of
products and processes). Such innovations provide
competitive advantages in the production of
machines, vehicles, consumer durable goods, etc.
(Hall and Soskice 2001). A reform of the labour
market institutions is not necessary as long as they
allow Germany to specialise on value-added inten-
sive production. On the other hand, the feedback
effects also prevent the necessary structural adapta-
CESifo DICE Report 4/2003 36
Research ReportsCESifo DICE Report 4/2003 37
Research Reports
tion processes and lead to a conflict between the
forces of the status quo and the reactions of the
mobile factors of production.
The politics of institutional transfers
In addition to the spontaneous (power-free) insti-
tutional development processes that the concept of
the path dependency is based on, government
power, constraints on political decision-making
processes and the influence of pressure groups can
be the cause of institutional inflexibility. They can
also hinder an international institution transfer ini-
tiated by systems competition. Power and interests
play a role in the perception and selection of
advantageous institutional arrangements and in
convincing socially relevant groups of the benefits
of these institutions. They are of even greater
importance with regard to decisions on the actual
introduction and application of the regulations.
Political decision-making processes are deter-
mined by the monopoly power of the state to
determine the design and the sequence of the
reform steps as well as by the necessity to attain
voter approval for the reforms. If the potential
results of the institutional reforms are highly inse-
cure, a revision of the reforms can be very costly,
and if many voters feel they are losers of the
reforms, their resistance is likely (Roland 2002). If
the losers are members of powerful pressure
groups, the reforms will be prevented.
Resistances to the adoption of foreign labour mar-
ket regulations in the wake of systems competition
can have different causes:
• The number of losers is greater than the number
of winners. For example, with a liberalisation of
the dismissal protection laws, the risk of job loss
can increase for many insiders, and the chance
to find jobs may increase only for relatively few
unemployed persons.
• Although the number of losers resulting from a
labour market reform is small,the great number
of winners consists of heterogeneous groups
that pursue different interests apart from the
labour market reform and therefore cannot
agree on a common reform strategy. In this case
the resistance of the losers could be successful.
• Uncertainty regarding the effects of reform is
widespread. Many (risk-averse) people affected
by the reform cannot foresee whether they will
be among the losers or not, and thus favour a
retention of the quo status.
• If the reform is associated with efficiency
increases, the losers could be made into winners
by way of compensation payments. However,
the losers fear that the compensation payments
may not be high enough or may be cancelled in
future and therefore refuse to approve the
reform (Dewatripont and Roland 1995; Saint-
Paul 2000).
Outlook for a reform of labour market
institutions
Several factors have been mentioned to explain the
inertia of German labour market institutions with
regard to the forces of systems competition. The
extent to which these have contributed to the
reform backlog and have prevented the reduction
of social benefits could not be examined in this
article.It has been demonstrated,however,that the
strength of systems competition with regard to
German labour market institutions may have been
relatively small.This might change in the course of
the eastern EU enlargement, however.
With the eastern enlargement the EU will unite
about 25 countries in a homogeneous market in
which the four basic freedoms of the Rome treaties
will apply to a large extent. The number of EU
inhabitants will increase by around 106 million or
by 28 percent. Joining the EU will be countries
whose wages are a tenth to a fifth of western
German wages, at least at present exchange rates
(on the basis of purchasing power parities the wage
gap is smaller).After eastern enlargement German
enterprises will examine sites in Eastern Europe
even more carefully than now and will contract for
new locations. The high wages and the strong dis-
missal protection in Germany as well as the tax
burden and other locational factors will come
under close scrutiny.
Eastern EU enlargement will trigger a strong
migration to the west.Living conditions in the east
will not approximate those in the west for some
time. According to estimates of the Ifo Institute,
approximately 4 to 5 percent of the inhabitants of
the Eastern European accession countries will
migrate to Germany (net), resulting in a net
migration of about 4 to 5 million persons (Sinn et
al. 2001).Migration will produce wage pressure, especially
for the less qualified in the labour market, despite
the possible earnings boost for the majority of
German residents. If displacement effects in com-
petition for jobs are to be avoided, the adaptability
of the German labour markets must be improved.
In addition migration will also place pressure on
western European social systems. In the choice of
their target country, eastern European migrants
will be guided among other things by the generos-
ity of the social welfare systems.3 In this situation
western European countries will endeavour to
reform their social services so as not to exert any
unnecessary migration incentives. On the other
hand, a number of high earners in Germany, who
are strongly burdened by migration in a redistrib-
uting social welfare state, will seek out a country
with a lower tax burden. The German (and
European) welfare state will thus be exposed to
erosive forces (Sinn and Ochel 2003).
Conclusion
National institutional systems are frequently char-
acterised by strong inertia.This is also the case for
the German system of labour market institutions.
Although exposed to systems competition, this
seems to have been relatively weak thus far. In
addition governments, who are responsible for the
reform of labour market institutions, are not only
influenced by the needs of the mobile agents of
production.They are engaged in political competi-
tion and attempt (in democratic societies) to take
into account the possibly contrary wishes of the
voters. They must also consider that path-based
feedback effects can bring about costs of institu-
tional change. Finally it is difficult for them to
ignore the interests of powerful groups.
The resistance to reform of labour market institu-
tions, however, is not likely to continue in the pre-
vious form.The eastern enlargement of the EU will
intensify systems competition which will consider-
ably increase the pressure for reform.
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3Typically immigrants work,at least temporarily,in low-skilled jobs
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ern European welfare states.They earn low incomes and pay com-
parably low taxes and social insurance contributions while at the
same time benefiting from the tax financed spending of the state.